The complexity of modern clinical practice has highlighted the fallibility of individual clinicians' decision-making, with effective teamwork emerging as a key to patient safety. Dual process theory is widely accepted as a framework for individual decision-making, with type 1 processes responsible for fast, intuitive and automatic decisions and type 2 processes for slow, analytical decisions. However, dual process theory does not explain cognition at the group level, when individuals act in teams. Team cognition resulting from dynamic interaction of individuals is said to be more resilient to decision-making error and greater than simply aggregated cognition. Methods Clinicians were paired as teams and asked to solve a cognitive puzzle constructed as a drug calculation. The frequency at which the teams made incorrect decisions was compared with that of individual clinicians answering the same question. results When clinicians acted in pairs, 63% answered the cognitive puzzle correctly, compared with 33% of clinicians as individuals, showing a statistically significant difference in performance (χ 2 (1, n=116)=24.329, P<0.001). Based on the predicted performance of teams made up of the random pairing of individuals who had the same propensity to answer as previously, there was no statistical difference in the actual and predicted teams' performance. Conclusions Teams are less prone to making errors of decision-making than individuals. However, the improved performance is likely to be owing to the effect of aggregated cognition rather than any improved decision-making as a result of the interaction. There is no evidence of team cognition as an emergent and distinct entity.
InTroduCTIon
In the context of patient safety, it has been stated that 'patient care is a team sport', 1 a view underscored by the Institute of Medicine reports in 2001, which pronounced effective teamwork as being central to patient safety. 2 It is argued that outcomes of modern healthcare can no longer be reliant on an individual's decision-making because individual 'experts' are unable to cope with the complexities and multiple interdependencies required for optimal decision-making in patient care, which requires successful working in teams. Teamwork is felt to provide an effective barrier to clinical error with the 'human factors' perspective often cited as to why this should be so, where concepts such as communication, situation awareness, delegation and other collective behaviours proposed as the underlying teamwork mechanisms.
A potential problem with unquestioning acceptance that teamwork results in better patient care is a perpetuation of poor evidence. 3 From a research perspective, current teamwork concepts can only be described, and therefore assessed, by the explicit behaviours that are associated with them, since the underlying cognition is invisible to observation. 4 A solution is to adopt a conceptual framework that lifts the lid of the black box of team-based decision-making and makes the underlying cognitive structures apparent.
At the level of the individual, the cognitive basis for decision-making is well developed and can usefully be described by the dual process theory of cognition. 5 Thinking is believed to be the result of two distinctive processing types-type 1 processes are rapid and autonomous and characterised by offering default responses and type 2 processes are slow and deliberative and capable of reflecting on the default responses and either modifying or rejecting them in favour of a more rationalised response. The former tends to be associative and results in minimal cognitive load, whereas the later utilises conscious consideration of data and application of algorithms and decision trees, thus carrying a greater cognitive load. 6 System 1 is experience driven and requires a database of prior experiences to draw on, in contrast to system 2 processes which are reflective and algorithmic, thus not dependent on a cumulative knowledge. The interplay of system 1 and 2 processes together underpin diagnostic reasoning, with a requirement of system 2 as a set of checks and balances to prevent erroneous conclusions in effective clinical applications. [6] [7] [8] System 1 errors are rooted in rapid and intuitive interpretation of data, potentially resulting in inaccurate decision-making.
However, dual process theory does not explain team cognition, for which a different conceptual model is required. For the purpose of this review, the term team will refer to two or more persons working together in a dynamic, high-pressure environment, where the key features are interdependence of the members and limited lifespan. 9 Early theory of team cognition followed the observation that dynamic teams were able to coordinate actions without overt communication, 10 and the sequential steps required to complete a team-based task did not require explicit communication between team members. From this, the allied concepts of collective competence, interactive consciousness, group consciousness, collective intelligence and heedful interrelating were proposed. [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] In these constructions, knowledge is said to be possessed by the team, which functions as a dynamic neural network.
original article
Collective cognition is thought to be different from the sum of the individual team member cognitions, and is stated to exist in the interaction between team members rather than in the cognition of the individuals themselves. 16 It describes those processes that organise and distribute knowledge among team members so that the team is able to perform its tasks and actions as a single entity. 17 Importantly, the 'cognitive system' is intimately linked to context and ceases to exist outside the context of the task. 16 There are two major perspectives on how team cognition operates. These are the shared mental model and the transactive memory perspectives. 17 The shared cognition model proposes that knowledge held as a team is either overlapping (knowledge is congruent and held in common by members) or complementary (knowledge that is distributed among team members). 18 However, this 'aggregated' knowledge may not be fully explanatory since it does not incorporate the interaction thought to be fundamental to team cognition, 16 and it is from this interaction that collective cognition is said to emerge. 19 Transactive memory describes team-level memory emerging from members' collective awareness of who carries what knowledge, with the team cognition arising as either similar (compositional) to the individual members' knowledge or something new (compilational). 17 20-22 We previously studied an aspect of the cognitive processes of individual clinicians, their thinking dispositions, by posing a cognitive puzzle formulated as a clinical question (below). We found that 103 of 153 (67%) clinicians answered the puzzle incorrectly, therefore, displaying a propensity for a 'quick and casual' thinking disposition. 23 ► The dose of a combination drug (Drug A+Drug B) is 110 mg. ► Drug A is 100 mg more than Drug B. ► What is the dose of Drug B? Given this baseline for individual decision-making to be prone to system 2-situated error, our primary aim was to determine if teams performed better when solving the cognitive puzzle and whether the thinking dispositions of individual members were altered or merely aggregated when clinicians performed as a team. Taking a cognitive perspective, one may postulate that within a team, collective cognition heightens each member's vigilance to system 1 error, thus increasing a disposition for slow and cautious system 2 processes.
The second aim of this study was to determine whether there was any suggestion of 'emergent' team cognition that was more effective than the aggregated cognitions of the individual members. We would postulate that if an emergent cognition was anything more than an aggregation of individual cognitions, more teams would arrive at the correct answer than would be predicted by a random pairing of individuals from the same group, that is, by chance alone.
MeThods
The study sample was drawn from a cohort of clinicians attending simulation-based training courses at our institution. These clinicians were invited to participate in the study after a description of its aim to assess cognition in teams and its possible association with error. For consistency, we used the same questionnaire as in the previous study evaluating individual thinking dispositions, but changed the wording to reflect that the respondents were pairs rather than individuals. The critical question was related to the cognitive puzzle, but extra distracting questions counteracted possible hypervigilance to the puzzle, consequently promoting type 1 thinking processes in team members. We also included a question seeking the team's self-reported error in the previous 2 weeks to be consistent with the first study.
ethics
Anonymity was guaranteed and participants who did not wish to participate could return their questionnaires blank without the researcher being aware of their non-participation. In this way, responding and non-responding clinicians could not be distinguished by the researchers.
statistical analysis
All data were treated as categorical, and a Χ 2 test was used to compare groups, with an a priori level of significance (alpha error) set at 0.05. The end points measured were the number of teams settling for the incorrect answer to the cognitive puzzle.
resulTs
There were 116 pairs who participated in the study, with 116 completed returns (100% response rate). Of these, 73 (63%) answered the cognitive puzzle correctly and 43 (37%) incorrectly. In direct comparison, our previous study with 153 individuals showed that 50 (33%) answered the same cognitive puzzle correctly and 103 (67%) incorrectly (figure 1). 23 To determine whether the pairs performed differently to individuals, a cross-tabulation was performed combining data from the previous study (table 1) , and the Χ 2 test showed a statistically significant difference between the groups (χ 2 (1, n=116)=24.329, P<0.001).
To answer the question of whether an emergent team cognition was more than an aggregation of individual cognitions, we calculated the likelihood of how pairs drawn from the same population as the individual clinicians would answer the puzzle. Applying the results from the individual thinking dispositions study, we may expect an individual to choose correctly 33% of the time and incorrectly 67% of the time. Based on the assumptions that members of the pairs answered in the same way as the clinicians had as individuals, the pairs were selected randomly and one member's correct response would result in a correct 
dIsCussIon
On the face of it, pairs significantly outperform individuals in achieving the correct answer to a cognitive puzzle, which confirms the widely held belief that teams are less prone to error. This is not a new finding, and one of the central planks in error prevention for drug administration is the procedure of cross-checking or double-checking, where two healthcare professionals check each other's work. Nursing practice has long recognised the value of having two persons checking high-stakes decisions such as drug doses, intravenous fluids or counting swabs after surgery.
However, even though the teams configured as pairs performed better in this study, it is worrying that they were still incorrect 37% of the time. Most patient safety agencies continue to advocate cross-checking as a good method for error prevention, but there is little evidence that it is effective, and its mechanism for working is poorly understood. 24 25 Some have gone so far as to question whether this practice is actually contributory to error. 26 Although our study has not set out to explicitly look at crosschecking, it does raise questions about potential mechanisms of failure.
Although we have shown that teams outperform individuals, a deeper question is whether a team configuration confers added value beyond the summation of individual clinicians' flawed cognitions. We have previously shown that a majority of clinicians display a 'quick and casual' thinking disposition when faced with a cognitive puzzle in the form of a drug calculation, with only 33% answering the puzzle correctly, so displaying a 'slow and cautious' thinking disposition. 23 When constructed as theoretical pairs whose members have the same propensity to answer correctly as they would as individuals and who are randomly paired with each other, there is no difference in the way they performed compared with actual teams. On the basis of these findings, we can infer that the teams' knowledge is, at most, complementary and distributed among members. No new 'compilational' knowledge has been created. From this study, we must conclude that there is no evidence for any different 'emergent' thinking disposition that is greater than the sum of its parts.
This finding is somewhat surprising. Although the individual members of a team are presumably prone to the same automatic responses generated by system 1 thinking, they may be expected to raise each other's vigilance such that they are more prone to adopt a cautious mode of thinking. This, then, should result in a greater proportion of members calculating the correct answer and therefore result in a greater proportion of pairs generating the correct solution. The fact that this is not so indicates that teams confer no extra advantage other than the redundancy of more members who are likely to have a preference for a slow and cautious thinking disposition.
Although we have extrapolated aspects of team cognition from the ability of paired clinicians to answer a cognitive puzzle, this study has limitations. In our study, the assumption is made that at least one correct response in a team of two would result in a cumulative correct team response. In the cases where team members had different responses-for example, one person choosing a correct answer and another person an incorrect answer-we assumed that the correct decision would prevail, but in reality an aggregate team decision may be subject to a variety of complex influences on team dynamics. Well-described biases, such as anchoring and belief perseverance, where a voiced belief by one member becoming firmly held by all, may have influenced team members and thus affected the ultimate team decision. 7 Furthermore, team decision-making within clinical settings is likely to be influenced by inherent social hierarchies. Social influence in the form of perceived power and authority among team members may affect which answer would ultimately prevail as the team's response. 27 The pairs of clinicians we studied also do not conform to the definition of high-performance, dynamic healthcare teams. Finally, we have looked at cognition outside a functional context, and the emergence of team cognition is arguably determined by that context.
ConClusIons
This study has shown that teams outperform individuals when a task outcome depends on reliable decision-making. However, the superior performance can be explained by redundancy of team members, where any increase in the number of members results in an increased likelihood of the teams containing members who display a slow and cautious thinking mode. We have found no evidence that a team configuration alters the thinking dispositions of the individual team members, or evidence of emergent 'compilational' team cognition that is different from aggregated 
